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The form of a philosophical theory, often enough, is: Let’s try looking
over here.
(Fodor 1985, p. 31)
1 Introduction: taking physics seriously
NGC 1300 (shown in figure 1) is a spiral galaxy 65 million light years from
Earth.1 We have never been there, and (although I would love to be wrong
about this) we will never go there; all we will ever know about NGC 1300 is
what we can see of it from sixty-five million light years away, and what we can
infer from our best physics.
Fortunately, “what we can infer from our best physics” is actually quite a
lot. To take a particular example: our best theory of galaxies tells us that that
hazy glow is actually made up of the light of hundreds of billions of stars; our
best theories of planetary formation tell us that a sizable fraction of those stars
1Source: http://leda.univ-lyon1.fr/. This photo taken from http://hubblesite.org/
gallery/album/galaxy/pr2005001a/. [NB: issue of getting credit here.]
Figure 1: The spiral galaxy NGC 1300
1
ar
X
iv
:1
11
1.
21
89
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.hi
st-
ph
]  
9 N
ov
 20
11
have planets circling them, and our best theories of planetology tells us that
some of those planets have atmospheres with such-and-such properties. And
because I think that those “best theories” are actually pretty good theories, I
regard those inferences as fairly reliable. That is: I think there actually are
atmospheres on the surfaces of some of the planets in NGC 1300, with pretty
much the properties that our theories ascribe to them. That is: I think that
those atmospheres exist. I think that they are real. I believe in them. And I do
so despite the fact that, at sixty-five million light years’ distance, the chance of
directly observing those atmospheres is nil.
I present this example for two reasons. The first is to try to demystify —
deflate, if you will — the superficially “philosophical” — even “metaphysical”
— talk that inevitably comes up in discussions of “the ontology of the Everett
interpretation”. Talk of “existence” and “reality” can sound too abstract to
be relevant to physics (talk of “belief” starts to sound downright theological!)
but in fact, when I say that “I believe such-and-such is real” I intend to mean
no more than that it is on a par, evidentially speaking, with the planetary
atmospheres of distant galaxies.
The other reason for this example brings me to the main claim of this paper.
For the form of reasoning used above goes something like this: we have good
grounds to take such-and-such physical theory seriously; such-and-such physical
theory, taken literally, makes such-and-such ontological claim; therefore, such-
and-such ontological claim is to be taken seriously.2
Now, if the mark of a serious scientific theory is its breadth of application,
its explanatory power, its quantitative accuracy, and its ability to make novel
predictions, then it is hard to think of a theory more “worth taking seriously”
than quantum mechanics. So it seems entirely apposite to ask what ontological
claims quantum mechanics makes, if taken literally, and to take those claims
seriously in turn.
And quantum mechanics, taken literally, claims that we are living in a multi-
verse: that the world we observe around us is only one of countless quasi-classical
universes (“branches”) all coexisting. In general, the other branches are no more
observable than the atmospheres of NGC 1300’s planets, but the theory claims
that they exist, and so if the theory is worth taking seriously, we should take
the branches seriously too. To belabour the point:
According to our best current physics, branches are real.
Everett was the first to recognise this, but for much of the ensuing fifty years
it was overlooked: Everett’s claim to be “interpreting” existing quantum me-
chanics, and de Witt’s claim that “the quantum formalism is capable of yielding
its own interpretation” were regarded as too simplistic, and much discussion on
the Everett interpretation (even that produced by advocates such as Deutsch
2Philosophers of science will recognise that, for reasons of space, and to avoid getting
bogged down, I gloss over some subtle issues in the philosophy of science; the interested
reader is invited to consult, e. g. , Newton-Smith (1981), Psillos (1999), or Ladyman and Ross
(2007) for more on this topic.
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(1985)) took as read that the “preferred basis problem” — the question of how
the “branches” were to be defined — could be solved only by adding something
additional to the theory. Sometimes that “something” was additional physics,
adding a multiplicity of worlds to the unitarily-evolving quantum state (Deutsch
(1985), Bell (1981), Barrett (1999)). Sometimes it was a purpose-built theory of
consciousness: the so-called “many-minds theories” (Lockwood (1989), Albert
and Loewer (1988)). But whatever the details, the end result was a replace-
ment of quantum mechanics by a new theory, and furthermore a new theory
constructed specifically to solve the quantum measurement problem. No won-
der interest in such theories was limited: if the measurement problem really does
force us to change physics, hidden-variables theories like the de Broglie-Bohm
theory3 or dynamical-collapse theories like the GRW theory4 seem to offer less
extravagantly science-fictional options.
It now seems to be widely recognised that if Everett’s idea really is worth
taking seriously, it must be taken on Everett’s own terms: as an understanding of
what (unitary) quantum mechanics already claims, not as a proposal for how to
amend it. There is precedent for this: mathematically complex and conceptually
subtle theories do not always wear their ontological claims on their sleeves.
In general relativity, it took decades fully to understand that the existence of
gravity waves and black holes really is a claim of the theory rather than some
sort of mathematical artifact.
Likewise in quantum physics, it has taken the rise of decoherence theory to
illuuminate the structure of quantum physics in a way which makes the reality
of the branches apparent. But twenty years of decoherence theory, together with
the philosophical recognition that to be a “world” is not necessarily to be part of
a theory’s fundamental mathematical framework, now allow us to resolve — or,
if you like, to dissolve — the preferred basis problem in a perfectly satisfactory
way, as I shall attempt to show in the remainder of the paper.
2 Emergence and Structure
It is not difficult to see why Everett and de Witt’s literalism seemed unviable for
so long. The axioms of unitary quantum mechanics say nothing of “worlds” or
“branches”: they speak only of a unitarily-evolving quantum state, and however
suggestive it may be to write that state as a superposition of (what appear to
be) classically definite states, we are not justified in speaking of those states
as “worlds” unless they are somehow added into the formalism of quantum
mechanics. As Adrian Kent put it in his influential (1990) critique of Many-
Worlds interpretations:
. . . one can perhaps intuitively view the corresponding components
[of the wave function] as describing a pair of independent worlds. But
this intuitive interpretation goes beyond what the axioms justify: the
3SeeCushing, Fine, and Goldstein (1996) and references therein for more information.
4See Bassi and Ghirardi (2003) and references therein for more information.
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axioms say nothing about the existence of multiple physical worlds
corresponding to wave function components.
And so it appears that the Everettian has a dilemma: either the axioms of
the theory must be modified to include explicit mention of “multiple physical
worlds”, or the existence of these multiple worlds must be some kind of illu-
sion. But the dilemma is false. It is simply untrue that any entity not directly
represented in the basic axioms of our theory is an illusion. Rather, science
is replete with perfectly respectable entities which are nowhere to be found in
the underlying microphysics. Douglas Hofstader and Daniel Dennett make this
point very clearly:
Our world is filled with things that are neither mysterious and
ghostly nor simply constructed out of the building blocks of physics.
Do you believe in voices? How about haircuts? Are there such
things? What are they? What, in the language of the physiicist,
is a hole - not an exotic black hole, but just a hole in a piece of
cheese, for instance? Is it a physical thing? What is a symphony?
Where in space and time does “The Star-Spangled Banner” exist?
Is it nothing but some ink trails in the Library of Congress? Destroy
that paper and the anthem would still exist. Latin still exists but
it is no longer a living language. The language of the cavepeople
of France no longer exists at all. The game of bridge is less than
a hundred years old. What sort of a thing is it? It is not animal,
vegetable, or mineral.
These things are not physical objects with mass, or a chemical com-
position, but they are not purely abstract objects either - objects
like the number pi, which is immutable and cannot be located in
space and time. These things have birthplaces and histories. They
can change, and things can happen to them. They can move about -
much the way a species, a disease, or an epidemic can. We must not
suppose that science teaches us that every thing anyone would want
to take seriously is identifiable as a collection of particles moving
about in space and time. Hofstadter and Dennett (1981, pp. 6–7)
The generic philosophy-of-science term for entities such as these is emergent :
they are not directly definable in the language of microphysics (try defining a
haircut within the Standard Model!) but that does not mean that they are
somehow independent of that underlying microphysics. To look in more detail
at a particularly vivid example,5 consider Figure 2.6 Tigers are (I take it!)
unquestionably real, objective physical objects, but the Standard model con-
tains quarks, electrons and the like, but no tigers. Instead, tigers should be
understood as patterns, or structures, within the states of that microphysical
theory.
5I first presented this example in Wallace (2003).
6Photograph @ Philip Wallace, 2007. Reproduced with permission.
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Figure 2: An object not among the basic posits of the Standard Model
To see how this works in practice, consider how we could go about studying,
say, tiger hunting patterns. In principle — and only in principle — the most
reliable way to make predictions about these would be in terms of atoms and
electrons, applying molecular dynamics directly to the swirl of molecules which
make up, say, the Kanha National Park (one of the sadly diminishing places
where Bengal tigers can be found). In practice, however (even ignoring the
measurement problem itself!) this is clearly insane: no remotely imaginable
computer would be able to solve the 1035 or so simultaneous dynamical equations
which would be needed to predict what the tigers would do.
Actually, the problem is even worse than this. For in a sense, we do have
a computer capable of telling us how the positions and momentums of all the
molecules in the Kanha National Park change over time. It is called the Kanha
National Park. (And it runs in real time!) Even if, per impossibile, we managed
to build a computer simulation of the Park accurate down to the last electron,
it would tell us no more than what the Park itself tells us. It would provide
no explanation of any of its complexity. (It would, of course, be a superb
vindication of our extant microphysics.)
If we want to understand the complex phenomena of the Park, and not
just reproduce them, a more effective strategy can be found by studying the
structures observable at the multi-trillion-molecule level of description of this
‘swirl of molecules’. At this level, we will observe robust — though not 100%
reliable — regularities, which will give us an alternative description of the tiger
in a language of cell membranes, organelles, and internal fluids. The principles
by which these interact will be derivable from the underlying microphysics, and
will involve various assumptions and approximations; hence very occasionally
they will be found to fail. Nonetheless, this slight riskiness in our description
is overwhelmingly worthwhile given the enormous gain in usefulness of this new
description: the language of cell biology is both explanatorily far more powerful,
and practically far more useful, than the language of physics for describing tiger
behaviour.
Nonetheless it is still ludicrously hard work to study tigers in this way. To
reach a really practical level of description, we again look for patterns and
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regularities, this time in the behaviour of the cells that make up individual
tigers (and other living creatures which interact with them). In doing so we will
reach yet another language, that of zoology and evolutionary adaptationism,
which describes the system in terms of tigers, deer, grass, camouflage and so on.
This language is, of course, the norm in studying tiger hunting patterns, and
another (in practice very modest) increase in the riskiness of our description is
happily accepted in exchange for another phenomenal rise in explanatory power
and practical utility.
The moral of the story is: there are structural facts about many microphys-
ical systems which, although perfectly real and objective (try telling a deer that
a nearby tiger is not objectively real) simply cannot be seen if we persist in
describing those systems in purely microphysical language. Talk of zoology is
of course grounded in cell biology, and cell biology in molecular physics, but
the entities of zoology cannot be discarded in favour of the austere ontology
of molecular physics alone. Rather, those entities are structures instantiated
within the molecular physics, and the task of almost all science is to study
structures of this kind.
Of which kind? (After all, “structure” and “pattern” are very broad terms:
almost any arrangement of atoms might be regarded as some sort of pattern.)
The tiger example suggests the following answer, which I have previously Wal-
lace (2003, p.93) called “Dennett’s criterion” in recognition of the very similar
view proposed by Daniel Dennett (Dennett 1991):
Dennett’s criterion: A macro-object is a pattern, and the ex-
istence of a pattern as a real thing depends on the usefulness —
in particular, the explanatory power and predictive reliability — of
theories which admit that pattern in their ontology.
Dennett’s own favourite example is worth describing briefly in order to show
the ubiquity of this way of thinking: if I have a computer running a chess
program, I can in principle predict its next move from analysing the electrical
flow through its circuitry, but I have no chance of doing this in practice, and
anyway it will give me virtually no understanding of that move. I can achieve
a vastly more effective method of predictions if I know the program and am
prepared to take the (very small) risk that it is being correctly implemented
by the computer, but even this method will be practically very difficult to use.
One more vast improvement can be gained if I don’t concern myself with the
details of the program, but simply assume that whatever they are, they cause
the computer to play good chess. Thus I move successively from a language of
electrons and silicon chips, through one of program steps, to one of intentions,
beliefs, plans and so forth — each time trading a small increase in risk for an
enormous increase in predictive and explanatory power.7
7It is, of course, highly contentious to suppose that a chess-playing computer really believes,
plans etc. Dennett himself would embrace such claims (see Dennett (1987) for an extensive
discussion), but for the purposes of this section there is no need to resolve the issue: the
computer can be taken only to ‘pseudo-plan’, ‘pseudo-believe’ and so on, without reducing
the explanatory importance of a description in such terms.
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Nor is this account restricted to the relation between physics and the rest
of science: rather, it is ubiquitous within physics itself. Statistical mechanics
provides perhaps the most important example of this: the temperature of bulk
matter is an emergent property, salient because of its explanatory role in the
behaviour of that matter. (It is a common error in textbooks to suppose that
statistical-mechanical methods are used only because in practice we cannot cal-
culate what each atom is doing separately: even if we could do so, we would be
missing important, objective properties of the system in question if we abstained
from statistical-mechanical talk.) But it is somewhat unusual because (unlike
the case of the tiger) the principles underlying statistical-mechanical claims are
(relatively!) straightforwardly derivable from the underlying physics.
For an example from physics which is closer to the cases already discussed,
consider the case of quasi-particles in solid-state physics. As is well known,
vibrations in a (quantum-mechanical) crystal, although they can in principle
be described entirely in terms of the individual crystal atoms and their quan-
tum entanglement with one another, are in practice overwhelmingly simpler to
describe in terms of ‘phonons’ — collective excitations of the crystal which be-
have like ‘real’ particles in most respects. And furthermore, this sort of thing
is completely ubiquitous in solid-state physics, with different sorts of excitation
described in terms of different sorts of “quasi-particle” — crystal vibrations are
described in terms of phonons; waves in the magnetisation direction of a fer-
romagnet are described in terms of magnons, collective waves in a plasma are
described in terms of plasmons, etc.
Are quasi-particles real? They can be created and annihilated; they can
be scattered off one another; they can be detected (by, for instance, scattering
them off “real” particles like neutrons); sometimes we can even measure their
time of flight; they play a crucial part in solid-state explanations. We have no
more evidence than this that “real” particles exist, and so it seems absurd to
deny that quasi-particles exist — and yet, they consist only of a certain pattern
within the constituents of the solid-state system in question.
When exactly are quasi-particles present? The question has no precise an-
swer. It is essential in a quasi-particle formulation of a solid-state problem
that the quasi-particles decay only slowly relative to other relevant timescales
(such as their time of flight) and when this criterion (and similar ones) are met
then quasi-particles are definitely present. When the decay rate is much too
high, the quasi-particles decay too rapidly to behave in any ‘particulate’ way,
and the description becomes useless explanatorily; hence, we conclude that no
quasi-particles are present. It is clearly a mistake to ask exactly when the decay
time is short enough (2.54 × the interaction time?) for quasi-particles not to
be present, but the somewhat blurred boundary between states where quasi-
particles exist and states when they don’t should not undermine the status of
quasi-particles as real, any more than the absence of a precise boundary to a
mountain undermines the existence of mountains.
One more point about emergence will be relevant in what follows. In a cer-
tain sense emergence is a bottom-up process: knowledge of all the microphysical
facts about the tiger and its environment suffices to derive all the tiger-level facts
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(in principle, and given infinite computing power). But in another sense it is
a top-down process: no algorithmic process, applied to a complex system, will
tell us what higher-level phenomena to look for in that system. What makes it
true that (say) a given lump of organic matter has intentions and desires is not
something derivable algorithmically from that lump’s microscopic constituents;
it is the fact that, when it occurs to us to try interpreting its behaviour in terms
of beliefs and desires, that strategy turns out to be highly effective.
3 Decoherence and quasiclassicality
We now return to quantum mechanics, and to the topic of decoherence. In this
section I will briefly review decoherence theory, in a relatively simple context
(that of non-relativistic particle mechanics) and in the environment-induced
framework advocated by, e. g. , Joos, Zeh, Kiefer, Giulini, Kubsch, and Stame-
tescu (2003) and Zurek (1991, 2003). (An alternative formalism — the “deco-
herent histories” framework advocated by, e. g. , Gell-Mann and Hartle (1990)
and Halliwell (1998) — is presented in the Introduction to this volume and in
Halliwell’s contribution to this volume.)
The basic setup is probably familiar to most readers. We assume that the
Hilbert space H of the system we are interested in is factorised into “system”
and “environment” subsystems, with Hilbert spaces HS and HE respectively —
H = HS ⊗HE . (1)
Here, the “environment” might be a genuinely external environment (such as
the atmosphere or the cosmic microwave background); equally, it might be an
“internal environment”, such as the microscopic degrees of freedom of a fluid.
For decoherence to occur, there needs to be some basis {|α〉} of HS such that
the dynamics of the system-environment interaction give us
|α〉⊗|ψ〉 −→ |α〉⊗|ψ;α〉 (2)
and
〈ψ;α|ψ;β〉 ' δ(α− β). (3)
on timescales much shorter than those on which the system itself evolves. (Here
I use α as a “schematic label”. In the case of a discrete basis δ(α − β) is
a simple Kronecker delta; in the case of a continuous basis, such as a basis of
wavepacket states, then (3) should be read as requiring 〈α|β〉 ' 0 unless α ' β.)
In other words, the environment effectively “measures” the state of the system
and records it. (The orthogonality requirement can be glossed as “record states
are distinguishable”, or as “record states are dynamically sufficiently different”,
or as “record states can themselves be measured”; all, mathematically, trans-
late into a requirement of orthogonality). Furthermore, we require that this
measurement happens quickly: quickly, that is, relative to other relevant dy-
namical timescales for the system. (I use “decoherence timescale” to refer to
the characteristic timescale on which the environment measures the system.)
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Decoherence has a number of well-known consequences. Probably the best-
known is diagonalisation of the system’s density operator. Of course, any den-
sity operator is diagonal in some basis, but decoherence guarantees that the
system density operator will rapidly become diagonal in the {|α〉} basis, inde-
pendently of its initial state: any initially non-diagonalised state will rapidly
have its non-diagonal elements decay away.
Diagonalisation is a synchronic result: a constraint on the system at all
times (or at least, on all time-intervals of order the decoherence timescale).
But the more important consequence of decoherence is diachronic, unfolding
over a period of time much longer than the decoherence timescale. Namely:
because the environment is constantly measuring the system in the {|α〉} basis,
any interference between distinct terms in this basis will be washed away. This
means that, in the presence of decoherence, the system’s dynamics is quasi-
classical in an important sense. Specifically: if we want to know the expectation
value of any measurement on the system at some future time, it suffices to know
what it would be were the system prepared in each particular |α〉 at the present
time (that is, to start the system in the state |α〉⊗|ψ〉 (for some environment
state |ψ〉 whose exact form is irrelevant within broad parameters) and evolve
it forwards to the future time), and then take a weighted sum of the resultant
values. Mathematically speaking, this is equivalent to treating the system as
though it were in some definite but unknown |α〉.
Put mathematically: suppose that the superoperator R governs the evolu-
tion of density operators over some given time interval, so that if the system
intially has density operator ρ then it has density operator R(ρ) after that time
interval. Then in the presence of decoherence,
R(ρ) =
∫
dα 〈α| ρ |α〉R(|α〉 〈α|). (4)
(Again: this integral is meant schematically, and should be read as a sum or an
integral as appropriate.)
And of course, quasi-classicality is rather special. The reason, in general,
that the quantum state cannot straightforwardly be regarded as a probabilistic
description of a determinate underlying reality is precisely that interference ef-
fects prevent the dynamics being quasi-classical. In the presence of decoherence,
however, those interference effects are washed away.
4 The significance of decoherence
It might then be thought — perhaps, at one point, it was thought — that de-
coherence alone suffices to solve the measurement problem. For if decoherence
picks out a certain basis for a system, and furthermore has the consequence that
the dynamics of that system are quasi-classical, then — it might seem — we can
with impunity treat the system not just as quasi -classical but straightforwardly
as classical. In effect, this would be to use decoherence to give a precise and
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observer-independent definition of the collapse of the wavefunction: the quan-
tum state evolves unitarily as long as superpositions which are not decohered
from one another do not occur; when such superpositions do occur, the quan-
tum state collapses instantaneously into one of them. To make this completely
precise would require us to discretize the dynamics so that the system evolves in
discrete time steps rather than continuously The decoherent-histories formalism
mentioned earlier is a rather more natural mathematical arena to describe this
than the continuous formalism I developed in section 3, but the result is the
same in any case: decoherence allows us to extract from the unitary dynam-
ics a space of histories (strings of projectors onto decoherence-preferred states)
and to assign probabilities to each history in a consistent way (i. e. , without
interference effects causing the probability calculus to be violated.
From a conceptual point of view there is something a bit odd about this
strategy. Decoherence is a dynamical process by which two components of
a complex entity (the quantum state) come to evolve independently of one
another, and it occurs due to rather high-level, emergent consequences of the
particular dynamics and initial state of our Universe. Using this rather complex
high-level process as a criterion to define a new fundamental law of physics is, at
best, an exotic variation of normal scientific practice. (To take a philosophical
analogy, it would be as if psychologists constructed a complex theory of the
brain, complete with a physical analysis of memory, perception, reasoning and
the like — and then decreed that, as a new fundamental law of physics (and not
a mere definition), a system was conscious if and only if it had those physical
features.8)
Even aside from such conceptual worries, however, a pure-decoherence so-
lution to the measurement problem turns out to be impossible on technical
grounds: the decoherence criterion is both too strong, and too weak, to pick out
an appropriate set of classical histories from the unitary quantum dynamics.
That decoherence is too strong a condition should be clear from the language
of section 3. Everything there was approximate, effective, for-all-practical-
purposes: decoherence occurs on short timescales (not instantaneously); it causes
interference effects to become negligible (not zero); it approximately diagonalises
the density operator (not exactly); it approximately selects a preferred basis (not
precisely). And while approximate results are fine for calculational shortcuts or
for emergent phenomena, they are most unwelcome when we are trying to de-
fine new fundamental laws of physics. (Put another way, a theory cannot be
99.99804% conceptually coherent.)
That it is too weak is more subtle, but ultimately even more problematic.
There are simply far too many bases picked out by decoherence — in the lan-
guage of section 3 there are far too many system-environment splits which give
rise to an approximately decoherent basis for the system; in the language of
decoherent histories, there are far too many choices of history that lead to
consistent classical probabilities. Worse, there are good reasons (cf Dowker and
8As it happens, this is not a straw man: David Chalmers has proposed something rather
similar. See Chalmers (1996) for an exposition, and Dennett (2001) for some sharp criticism.
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Kent (1996))to think that many, many of these histories are wildly non-classical.
What can be done? Well, if we turn away from the abstract presentation
of decoherence theory, and look at the concrete models (mathematical models
and computer simulations) to which decoherence has been applied, and if, in
those models, we make the sort of system/environment split that fits our natural
notion of environment (so that we take the environment, as suggested previously,
to be — say — the microwave background radiation, or the residual degrees of
freedom of a fluid once its bulk degrees of freedom have been factored out), then
we find two things.
Firstly: The basis picked out by decoherence is approximately a coherent-
state basis: that is, it is a basis of wave-packets approximately localised in both
position and momentum. And secondly: The dynamics is quasi-classical not
just in the rather abstract, bloodless sense used in section 3, but in the sense
that the behaviour of those wave-packets approximates the behaviour predicted
by classical mechanics.
In more detail: let |q, p〉 denote a state of the system localised around
phase-space point (q, p). Then decoherence ensures that the state of the sys-
tem+environment at any time t can be written as
|Ψ〉 =
∫
dq dpαq, p; t |q, p〉⊗|(q, p)〉 (5)
with 〈(q, p)|(q′, p′)〉 = 0 unless q ' q′ and p ' p′. The conventional (i. e. ,
textbook) interpretation of quantum mechanics tells us that |α(q, p)|2 is the
probability density for finding the system in the vicinity of phase-space point
(q, p).9 Then in the presence of decoherence, |α|2(q, p) evolves, to a good ap-
proximation, like a classical probability density on phase space: it evolves,
approximately, under the Poisson equations
d
dt
(|α(q, p)|2) ' ∂H
∂q
∂|α(q, p)|2
∂p
− ∂H
∂p
∂|α(q, p)|2
∂q
(6)
where H(q, p) is the Hamiltonian.
On the assumption that the system is classically non-chaotic (chaotic systems
add a few subtleties), this is equivalent to the claim that each individual wave-
packet follows a classical trajectory on phase space. Structurally speaking, the
dynamical behaviour of each wave-packet is the same as the behaviour of a
macroscopic classical system. And if there are multiple wave-packets, the system
is dynamically isomorphic to a collection of independent classical systems.
(Caveat : this does not mean that the wave-packets are actually evolving
on phase space. If phase space is understood as the position-momentum space
of a collection of classical point particles, then of course the wave-packets are
9At a technical level, this requires the use of phase-space POVMs (i. e. , positive opera-
tor valued measures, a generalisation of the standard projection-valued measures; see, e. g. ,
Nielsen and Chuang (2000) for details): for instance, the continuous family {N |q, p〉 〈q, p|} is
an appropriate POVM for suitably-chosen normalisation constant N . Of course, this or any
phase-space POVM can only be defined for measurements of accuracy ≤ h¯.
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not evolving on phase space. They are evolving on a space isomorphic to phase
space. Henceforth when I speak of phase space, I mean this space, not the “real”
phase space.)
So: if we pick a particular choice of system-environment split, we find a
“strong” form of quasi-classical behaviour: we find that the system is isomorphic
to a collection of dynamically independent simulacra of a classical system. We
did not find this isomorphism by some formal algorithm; we found it by making
a fairly unprincipled choice of system-environment split and then noticing that
that split led to interesting behaviour. The interesting behaviour is no less real
for all that.
We can now see that all three of the objections at the start of this section
point at the same — fairly obvious — fact: decoherence is an emergent process
occurring within an already-stated microphysics: unitary quantum mechanics.
It is not a mechanism to define a part of that microphysics. If we think of
quasiclassical histories as emergent in this way, then
• The “conceptual mystery” dissolves: we are not using decoherence to
define a dynamical collapse law, we are just using it as a (somewhat
pragmatic) criterion for when quantum systems display quasiclassical be-
haviour.
• There is nothing problematic about the approximateness of the decoher-
ence process: as we saw in section 2, this is absolutely standard features
of emergence.
• Similarly, the fact that we had no algorithmic process to tell us in a
bottom-up way what system-environment splits would lead to the discov-
ery of interesting structure is just a special case of section 2’s observation
that emergence is in general a somewhat top-down process.
Each decoherent history is an emergent structure within the underlying quantum
state, on a par with tigers, tables, and the other emergent objects of section 2
— that is, on a par with practically all of the objects of science, and no less real
for it.
But the price we pay for this account is that, if the fundamental dynam-
ics are unitary, at the fundamental level there is no collapse of the quantum
state. There is just a dynamical process — decoherence — whereby certain
components of that state become dynamically autonomous of one another. Put
another way: if each decoherent history is an emergent structure within the un-
derlying microphysics, and if the underlying microphysics doesn’t do anything
to prioritise one history over another (which it doesn’t) then all the histories
exist. That is: a unitary quantum theory with emergent, decoherence-defined
quasi-classical histories is a many-worlds theory.
5 Simulation or reality?
At this point, a skeptic might object:
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All you have shown is that certain features of the unitarily-evolving
quantum state are isomorphic to a classical world. If that’s true,
the most it shows that the quantum state is running a simulation of
the classical world. But I didn’t want to recover a simulation of the
world. I wanted to recover the world.
I rather hope that this objection is a straw man: as I attempted to illus-
trate in section 2, this kind of structural story about higher-level ontology (the
classical world is a structure instantiated in the quantum state) is totally ubiq-
uitous in science. But it seems to be a common enough thought (at least in
philosophical circles) to be worth engaging with in more detail.
Note firstly that the very assumption that a certain entity which is struc-
turally like our world is not our world is manifestly question-begging. How do
we know that space is three-dimensional? We look around us. How do we know
that we are seeing something fundamental rather than emergent? We don’t;
all of our observations (pace Maudlin, this volume) are structural observations,
and only the sort of aprioristic knowledge now fundamentally discredited in
philosophy could tell us more.
Furthermore, physics itself has always been totally relaxed about this sort
of possibility. A few examples will suffice:
• Solid matter — described so well, and in such accord with our obser-
vations, in the language of continua — long ago turned out to be only
emergently continuous, only emergently solid.
• Just as solid state physics deals with emergent quasi-particles, so — ac-
cording to modern “particle physics” — elementary particles themselves
turn out to be emergent from an underlying quantum field. Indeed, the
“correct” — that is, most explanatorily and predictively useful — way of
dividing up the world into particles of different types turns out to depend
on the energy scales at which we are working.10
• The idea that particles should be emergent from some field theory is
scarcely new: in the 19th century there was much exploration of the idea
that particles were topological structures within some classical continuum
(cf Epple (1998)), and later, Wheeler (1962) proposed that matter was
actually just a structural property of a very complex underlying space-
time. Neither proposal eventually worked out, but for technical reasons:
the proposals themselves were seen as perfectly reasonable.
• The various proposals to quantize gravity have always been perfectly
happy with the idea that space itself would turn out to be emergent.
10The best known example of this phenomenon occurs in quantum chromodynamics: treat-
ing the quark field in terms of approximately-free quarks works well at very high energies, but
at lower energies the appropriate particle states are hadrons and mesons; see, e. g. , Cheng
and Li (1984) and references therein for details. For a more mathematically tractable example
(in which even the correct choice of whether particles are fermionic or bosonic is energy-level-
dependent), see chapter 5 of Coleman (1985), esp. pp. 246–253.
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From Borel dust to non-commutative geometry to spin foam, program af-
ter program has been happy to explore the possibility that spacetime is
only emergently a four-dimensional continuum.11
• String theory, currently the leading contender for a quantum theory of
gravity, regards spacetime as fundamentally high-dimensional and only
emergently four-dimensional, and the recent development of the theory
makes the nature of that emergence more and more indirect (it has been
suggested, for instance, that the “extra” dimensions may be several cen-
timetres across12). The criterion for emergence, here as elsewhere, are
dynamical: if the functional integrals that define the cross-sections have
the approximate functional form of functional integrals of fields on four-
dimensional space, that is regarded as sufficient to establish emergence.
Leaving aside these sorts of naturalistic13 considerations, we might ask: what
distinguishes a simulation of a thing from the thing itself? It seems to me that
there are two relevant distinctions:
Dependency: Tigers don’t interact with simulations of tigers; they interact with the
computers that run those simulations. The simulations are instantiated
in “real” things, and depend on them to remain in existence.
Parochialism: Real things have to be made of a certain sort of stuff, and/or come about
in a certain sort of way. Remarkably tiger-like organisms in distant galax-
ies are not tigers; synthetic sparkling wine, however much it tastes like
champagne, is not champagne unless its origins and makeup fit certain
criteria.
Now, these considerations are themselves problematic. (Is a simulation of a
person themselves a person? — see (Hofstadter 1981) for more thoughts on
these matters). But, as I hope is obvious, both considerations are question-
begging in the context of the Everett interpretation: only if we begin with the
assumption that our world is instantiated in a certain way can we argue that
Everettian branches are instantiated in a relevantly different way.
6 How many worlds?
We are now in a position to answer one of the most commonly asked ques-
tions about the Everett interpretation,14 namely: how much branching actually
happens? As we have seen, branching is caused by any process which magnifies
microscopic superpositions up to the level where decoherence kicks in, and there
are basically three such processes:
11For the concept of Borel dust, see Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler (1973, p.1205); for refer-
ences on non-commutative geometry, see http://www.alainconnes.org/en/downloads.php; for
references on spin foam, see Rovelli (2004).
12For a brief introduction to this proposal, see Dine (2007, chapter 29).
13I use “naturalism” in Quine’s sense ((Quine 1969)): a naturalistic philosophy is one which
regards our best science as the only good guide to our best epistemology,
14Other than “and you believe this stuff?!”, that is.
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1. Deliberate human experiments: Schro¨dinger’s cat, the two-slit experiment,
Geiger counters, and the like.
2. “Natural quantum measurements”, such as occur when radiation causes
cell mutation.
3. Classically chaotic processes, which cause small variations in initial condi-
tions to grow exponentially, and so which cause quantum states which are
initially spread over small regions in phase space to spread over macro-
scopically large ones. (See Zurek and Paz (1994) for more details; I give
a conceptually oriented introduction in Wallace (2001).)
The first is a relatively recent and rare phenomenon, but the other two are ubiq-
uitous. Chaos, in particular, is everywhere, and where there is chaos, there is
branching (the weather, for instance, is chaotic, so there will be different weather
in different branches). Furthermore, there is no sense in which these phenom-
ena lead to a naturally discrete branching process. Quantum chaos gives rise to
macroscopic superpositions, and so to decoherence and to the emergence of a
branching structure, but that structure has no natural “grain”. To be sure, by
choosing a certain discretisation of (phase-)space and time, a discrete branching
structure will emerge, but a finer or coarser choice would also give branching.
And there is no “finest” choice of branching structure: as we fine-grain our
decoherent history space, we will eventually reach a point where interference
between branches ceases to be negligible, but there is no precise point where
this occurs. As such, the question “how many branches are there?” does not,
ultimately, make sense.
This may seem paradoxical — certainly, it is not the picture of “parallel
universes” one obtains from science fiction. But as we have seen in this chapter,
it is commonplace in emergence for there to be some indeterminacy (recall: when
exactly are quasi-particles of a certain kind present?) And nothing prevents us
from making statements like:
Tomorrow, the branches in which it is sunny will have combined
weight 0.7
— the combined weight of all branches having a certain macroscopic property is
very (albeit not precisely) well-defined. It is only if we ask: ”how many branches
are there in which it is sunny”, that we end up asking a question which has no
answer.
This bears repeating, as it is central to some of the arguments about prob-
ability in the Everett interpretation:
Decoherence causes the Universe to develop an emergent branching
structure. The existence of this branching is a robust (albeit emer-
gent) feature of reality; so is the mod-squared amplitude for any
macroscopically described history. But there is no non-arbitrary de-
composition of macroscopically-described histories into “finest grained”
histories, and no non-arbitrary way of counting those histories.
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(Or, put another way: asking how many worlds there are is like asking how
many experiences you had yesterday, or how many regrets a repentant criminal
has had. It makes perfect sense to say that you had many experiences or that he
had many regrets; it makes perfect sense to list the most important categories
of either; but it is a non-question to ask how many.)
If this picture of the world seems unintuitive, a metaphor may help.
1. Firstly, imagine a world consisting of a very thin, infinitely long and wide,
slab of matter, in which various complex internal processes are occurring
— up to and including the presence of intelligent life, if you like. In
particular one might imagine various forces acting in the plane of the
slab, between one part and another.
2. Now, imagine stacking many thousands of these slabs one atop the other,
but without allowing them to interact at all. If this is a “many-worlds
theory”, it is a many-worlds theory only in the sense of the philosopher
David Lewis (Lewis 1986): none of the worlds are dynamically in contact,
and no (putative) inhabitant of any world can gain empirical evidence
about any other.
3. Now introduce a weak force normal to the plane of the slabs — a force with
an effective range of 2-3 slabs, perhaps, and a force which is usually very
small compared to the intra-slab force. Then other slabs will be detectable
from within a slab but will not normally have much effect on events within
a slab. If this is a many-worlds theory, it is a science-fiction-style many-
worlds theory (or maybe a Phillip Pullman or C.S. Lewis many-worlds
theory15): there are many worlds, but each world has its own distinct
identity.
4. Finally, turn up the interaction sharply: let it have an effective range of
several thousand slabs, and let it be comparable in strength (over that
range) with characteristic short-range interaction strengths within a slab.
Now, dynamical processes will not be confined to a slab but will spread
over hundreds of adjacent slabs; indeed, evolutionary processes will not be
confined to a slab, so living creatures in this universe will exist spread over
many slabs. At this point, the boundary between slabs becomes epiphe-
nomenal. Nonetheless, this theory is stratified in an important sense:
dynamics still occurs predominantly along the horizontal axis and events
hundreds of thousands of slabs away from a given slab are dynamically
irrelevant to that slab.16 One might well, in studying such a system, di-
vide it into layers thick relative to the range of the inter-slab force — and
emergent dynamical processes in those layers would be no less real just
because the exact choice of layering is arbitrary.
15See, for instance, Pullman’s Northern Lights or Lewis’s The Magician’s Nephew.
16Obviously there would be ways of constructing the dynamics so that this was not the
case: if signals could easily propagate vertically, for instance, the stratification would be lost.
But it’s only a thought experiment, so we can construct the dynamics how we like.
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Ultimately, though, that a theory of the world is “unintuitive” is no argument
against it, provided it can be cleanly described in mathematical language. Our
intuitions about what is “reasonable” or “imaginable” were designed to aid our
ancestors on the savannahs of Africa, and the Universe is not obliged to conform
to them.
7 Conclusion
The claims of the Everett interpretation are:
• At the most fundamental level, the quantum state is all there is – quantum
mechanics is about the structure and evolution of the quantum state in
the same way that (e.g.) classical field theory is about the structure and
evolution of the fields.
• As such, the “Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics” is just quan-
tum mechanics itself, taken literally (or, as a philosopher of science might
put it, Realist-ically) as a description of the Universe. De Witt has been
widely criticized for his claim that ”the formalism of quantum mechanics
yields its own interpretation” (DeWitt 1970), but there is nothing mys-
terious or Pythagorean about it: every scientific theory yields its own
interpretation, or rather (cf David Deutsch’s contribution to this volume)
the idea that one can divorce a scientific theory from its interpretation is
confused.
• “Worlds” are mutually dynamically isolated structures instantiated within
the quantum state, which are structurally and dynamically “quasiclassi-
cal”.
• The existence of these “worlds” is established by decoherence theory.
No postulates about the worlds have needed to be added: the question of whether
decoherence theory does indeed lead to the emergence of a quasiclassical branch-
ing structure is (at least in principle) settled a priori for any particular quantum
theory once we know the initial state. It is not even a postulate that decoher-
ence is the source of all “worlds”; indeed, certain specialised experiments —
notably, some algorithms on putative quantum computers — would also give
rise to multiple quasiclassical worlds at least locally; cf. Deutsch (1997).17
17Since much hyperbole and controversy surrounds claims about Everett and quantum com-
putation, let me add two deflationary comments:
1. There is no particular reason to assume that all or even most interesting quantum
algorithms operate by any sort of “quantum parallelism” (that is: by doing different
classical calculations in a large number of terms in a superposition and then interfering
them). Indeed, Grover’s algorithm does not seem open to any such analysis. But Shor’s
algorithm, at least, does seem to operate in this way.
2. The correct claim to make about Shor’s algorithm is not (pace (Deutsch 1997)) that the
calculations could not have been done other than by massive parallelism, but simply
that the actual explanation of how they were done — that is, the workings of Shor’s
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I will end this discussion on a lighter note, aimed at a slightly different audi-
ence. I have frequently talked to physicists who accept Everett’s interpretation,
accept (at least when pressed!) that this entails a vast multiplicity of quasi-
classical realities, but reject the “many-worlds” label for the interpretation —
thhey prefer to say that there is only one world but it contains many non- or
hardly-interacting quasiclassical parts.
But, as I hope I have shown, the “many worlds” of Everett’s many-worlds
interpretation are not fundamental additions to the theory. Rather, they are
emergent entities which, according to the theory, are present in large numbers.
In this sense, the Everett interpretation is a “many-worlds theory” in just the
same sense as African zoology is a “many-hippos theory”: that is, there are enti-
ties whose existence is entailed by the theory which deserve the name “worlds”.
So, to Everettians cautious about the “many-worlds” label, I say: come on in,
the water’s lovely.
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